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Abstract
Strategy has become an important concern and practical tool in urban management and govern-
ance, with the literature highlighting implementation as a hallmark of effective strategy. Whilst
such a strategy–action link (which we label here as ‘implementation nexus’) has been well estab-
lished, other long-term effects have been documented in less detail. Our study of Sustainable
Sydney 2030 finds that strategy was effective to the extent to which it changed the institutional a
priori of what a collective of actors engaged in city-making knows, what it can articulate and how
its members relate to each other. We capture this effect as ‘institution nexus’ and theorise our
findings with Ludwik Fleck’s concept of ‘thought style’ of a focal ‘thought collective’ – notions that
also centrally influenced Mary Douglas’ work on ‘how institutions think’. We contribute to extant
research by adding the institution nexus as a long-term effect of urban strategy as well as by
advancing strategy theory in urban studies to foreground its ability to shape institutions.
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Introduction
As ‘watchword of our times’ (Carter, 2013),
strategy has profoundly shaped discourse
and practice of public administration includ-
ing urban management and governance.
Research has responded to this rise of strat-
egy and significantly advanced our under-
standing of the evolution of urban strategy
(Andres et al., 2020; Brandtner et al., 2017;
Kornberger, 2012) and public-sector strategy
more generally (Brown, 2010; Bryson and
George, 2020; Johanson, 2009; Stewart, 2004).
Studies analysed the nature of public-sector
strategy (Mulgan, 2009), its tools (Bryson,
2018), its ability to engender strategic change
(Pettigrew et al., 1992) and its promise to
enhance performance (George et al., 2019) at
all government levels (for an overview see
Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). More recently, work
investigating the nature of urban strategies has
elaborated on issues of power (Jalonen et al.,
2018) and suggests that strategy is not a neu-
tral planning tool but part and parcel of a per-
formative and disciplinary apparatus that
shapes the city and its constituents (Alexander
et al., 2012; Brorström, 2019; Kornberger and
Clegg, 2011; Vaara et al., 2010) as well as the
‘geometries of power’ (Certomà et al., 2020;
Vanolo, 2014).
However, existing literature has put less
emphasis on investigating strategy’s long-
term effect.1 We address this lacuna through
an empirical inquiry into the effect of the
Sustainable Sydney 2030 strategy over a 10-
year period. Our case poses a considerable
puzzle in this respect. Notably, not just the
city administration but also critical voices
regard Sydney 2030 as a ‘success story’
despite the fact that most of the projects pro-
posed in the strategy were not implemented.
Thus, we ask: why did stakeholders attribute
‘success’ to the strategy? Or, put in a more
scholarly way, what were its effects? Our
findings suggest that Sydney 2030’s effect
was to create shared sensibilities, a repertoire
of categories, vocabularies and frames, as
well as ways of relating those engaged in city
making to each other. In order to theorise
and discuss these findings, we draw on con-
cepts initially developed by Fleck (1935) and
later elaborated by Douglas (1986) and
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argue that Sydney 2030 changed the distinct
‘thought style’ of the ‘thought collective’ of
actors engaged in city-making. The effect of
urban strategy resides, so our central con-
cept claims, in its power to shape the shared
understandings on which a collective of
actors draws when directing their attention,
asking questions and exploring alternative
courses of action. Our study suggests that
one challenge of strategy practitioners is to
institute a shared socio-cognitive infrastruc-
ture for collective reasoning and action.
Our work offers two conceptual take-aways
from Sydney 2030. First, our article extends
current scholarship by recasting the question
of the effect of urban strategy. We argue that
strategy is effective to the extent to which it
shapes the thought style of a thought collective
and, in our case, through that, the city as an
institution. Building on work that suggests per-
formative aspects of strategy (see e.g.
Brandtner et al., 2017; Brorström, 2019; Van
den Ende and Van Marrewijk, 2018), and in
contrast to the idea that strategy’s raison d’être
lies in its implementation (which we describe
as ‘implementation nexus’), we refer to this as
the ‘institution nexus’. Our second contribu-
tion aims to deepen the conversation about
strategy in urban studies. We develop a critical
vocabulary to analyse strategy as pivotal
urban practice and response to a ‘new local-
ism’ (Katz and Nowak, 2017). Extending
ongoing conversations that discuss strategy,
tactics and power of urban actors (Andres
et al., 2020; Vanolo, 2014), our study high-
lights the long-term (infra-)structuring effects
of strategy.
Theoretical orientation
From the 1970s onwards, mounting critique
questioned strategic planning as an inade-
quate tool (Kaufman and Jacobs, 1987;
Wildavsky, 1973) and bureaucracy as an inad-
equate organisational form for efficient public
service delivery (Du Gay, 2000). A host of
new demands towards the public sector and a
series of reforms designed in response (such as
New Public Management; Hood, 1991) fur-
ther opened up public administration research
and practice towards strategy (Andrews et al.,
2012; Bryson, 2018; Kornberger, 2012;
Moore, 1995; Stewart, 2004). Paraphrasing
Osborne and Gaebler (1992): if government is
not about rowing but steering, then strategy –
that is, the setting of direction – becomes quite
logically its quintessential task. Thus, strategy
has been defined as ‘the development and exe-
cution of a plan of action to guide behavior in
pursuit of organizational goals’ (Brown, 2010:
212). ‘Being strategic’, then, is thought to
make the difference between success and fail-
ure in government: ‘Good strategy pays off’,
as Mulgan put it (2009: 2), because strategy
protects against the ‘tyranny of the immedi-
ate’ that (often politically induced) sacrifices
the future for the present (Mulgan, 2009: 3).
In contrast, strategy is about ‘purpose, direc-
tion and goals’ (Johanson, 2009), requiring
‘detailed work of analysis and planning and
keeping track of implementation’ (Mulgan,
2009: 3). Further research (e.g. George, 2020)
has investigated the conditions for successful
strategy implementation, which remains the
rationale for strategy work. Indeed, whilst a
‘pluralist and even fragmented’ (Ferlie and
Ongaro, 2015: 2) body of literature on public
strategy has emerged, the focus on implemen-
tation as the hallmark of strategy’s effective-
ness is widely shared across strategy schools.
For instance, Vining (2011) suggests a Porter-
esque framework, while Moore’s (2000) value
triangle provides a less literal translation of
business strategy tools to the public sector.
Others deploy a resource-based view to ana-
lyse competences and capabilities in public-
sector organisations (Bryson et al., 2007).
What these approaches share is the idea that
strategy’s effectiveness is a matter of putting
to use appropriate models or frameworks (e.g.
Five Forces, VRIN) that lead the way to
effective implementation.
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More critical literature emphasises the
messy realities of strategy-making in which
planned, emergent and realised strategies
intermingle, with the result that strategy ‘for-
mulation and implementation become indis-
tinguishable’ (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015: 32).
With this focus on adaptive strategy-making,
the implementation work has become an
important locus of strategy studies. For
instance, Brown (2010: 213) elaborates on
‘distributing strategizing activities throughout
the organization’ which should be ‘coupled
with increased managerial autonomy to allow
decision makers to reevaluate strategies and
execute midcourse corrections as conditions
change and new information becomes avail-
able’. Andres and colleagues (2020) highlight
the polyvocality of strategy where a variety of
powerful actors (including politicians, develo-
pers, citizen groups, etc.) develop conflicting
strategies resulting in emergent negotiated and
always only temporary order. Similarly, pro-
cessual accounts of strategy (Pettigrew et al.,
1992) argue for an understanding of strategy
as an ongoing and inherently political change
process. This process can be driven bottom-
up and creates ‘fluid governance structures’
that – at least partly and temporarily – change
existing power dynamics (Certomà et al.,
2020). As strategy formulation and execution
are difficult to disentangle, the focus is rather
on processes of learning and change that
unfold in often unforeseen directions with
unintended consequences. Following this
emergent account, strategy-making is not
beholden to a rigid top-down planning cycle
but a flexible, adaptive process.
A branch of this critical literature has
focused on strategy practices in the context
of cities (Brorström, 2019; Jalonen et al.,
2018; Kornberger, 2012). For instance,
Vaara and his colleagues (2010) highlighted
the power effects of strategy texts and gen-
res. Similarly, Kornberger and Clegg (2011)
analysed the performative effects of strategy
making, arguing that urban strategy may be
analysed as an aesthetic phenomenon that
aims to mobilise people, marshal political
will and legitimise decisions. Brandtner and
colleagues (2017) study strategy documents
as a discursive device through which local
governments enact aspired governance con-
figurations. Whilst these studies zoom in on
strategy and its making in city administra-
tions, they remain silent about the long-term
effects of strategy: they highlight how strat-
egy is being done but do not investigate what
strategy does. Indeed, a key point of critique
of practice-based studies of strategy is that
they focus too much on minute details and
hence lose sight of the effects of strategy.
In sum, we argue that the growing literature
that has reflected strategy’s rise in cities and
public administrations highlights that the hall-
mark of an effective strategy lies in its imple-
mentation, and that it is in turn through
implementation that strategy adapts to chang-
ing environments. Whilst this ‘implementation
nexus’ is well established, it is less well docu-
mented which other long-term effects of strat-
egy may occur. Intrigued by the assessment of
Sydney 2030 as a ‘success’, and simultaneously
puzzled by the lack of its implementation, the
following question motivates our investigation:
What is the long-term effect of strategy?
Our findings show that strategy effected
the city as institution, that is, strategy was
effective as it shaped common understand-
ing and social networks of those engaged in
city-making. We label this effect the ‘institu-
tion nexus’ and, in our discussion, theorise it
by building on Ludwik Fleck’s concept of
‘thought style’ and ‘thought collective’ of
actors engaged in city-making.
Empirical context, data and
method
Empirical setting: Sustainable Sydney
2030
Our empirical focus is the Sustainable
Sydney 2030 strategy crafted by the City of
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Sydney under the leadership of Lord Mayor
Clover Moore.2 Running as an independent
candidate, she emerged as the unlikely win-
ner of the 2004 election. Soon after assuming
office, the Lord Mayor embarked on a 2-
year strategy process – the first for Sydney
since the 1970s. This process resulted in the
final strategy document published in March
2008. For the Lord Mayor, the comprehen-
sive strategy was a legacy-building tool
beyond a (at that time unlikely) second term.
A close observer reflected:
She [Lord Mayor] also knew that she didn’t
necessarily have anything more than one term.
It was an unlikely win anyway. So one of her
big commitments was to get the kind of strate-
gic plan in place that would both guide the city
but would also need to be able to inspire peo-
ple, so that if she was not there in four years’
time there would still be something that was
carefully engaged, carefully consulted, had a
lot of buy in, and would actually inspire people
for it to keep going no matter who was in gov-
ernment here at the city or at the state level, or
at the federal level. (D, 2016)
What Sydney 2030 signalled to the electorate
was that the Lord Mayor had indeed a plan
for the future – which they rewarded with re-
electing her ever since, making her, now in
her fourth term, the longest serving mayor
since the establishment of the City of Sydney
in 1842.
In terms of content, Sydney 2030 pro-
posed sustainability as key to the future; it
identified three key values (‘green’, ‘global’
and ‘connected’), defined ten strategic direc-
tions, and elaborated them through ten con-
crete projects that were designed to bring the
strategy to life (such as reconnecting the har-
bour with the city, or integrating the western
edge of Sydney).3 In the detailed document,
the strategic intent was backed up by almost
200 action points that were meant to guide
implementation (see Kornberger and Clegg,
2011). Moreover, whilst Sydney 2030 was
conceived of as one strategy, it is important
to note that over the years it was accompa-
nied by the myriad of documents, standards
and plans in its support. In terms of process,
Sydney 2030 was the most extensive consul-
tation in Sydney’s history, engaging 12,000
people through workshops, roundtables,
public events and exhibitions; hundreds of
thousands more were reached through exten-
sive media coverage and the city’s online
channels.
Data collection
Our main data sources are interviews with
key actors, stretching over a decade.4 The
first series of interviews in 2007/2008 focused
on motivation and ambition of the strategy
project as well as the strategy-making pro-
cess itself. In 2016, we revisited our research
site twice: early in 2016, interviews with city
executives probed the effects of Sydney 2030.
In these conversations it transpired that
Sydney 2030 was perceived as a success –
despite the fact that only one out of ten pro-
posed projects was implemented. This
sparked our curiosity and we returned for
more fieldwork in September 2016. This
third round of interviews included strategists
within the city administration; in addition,
to ensure diversity in our sample, we also
interviewed actors with critical distance from
Sydney 2030. Interestingly, their assessment
did not differ substantially from that of city
administrators.
The selection of interview partners focused
on persons involved in the strategy process as
well as experts outside the city administration.
We had access to the city’s top management
team, including the city’s CEO, the heads of
urban strategy, planning, city design, city life,
sustainability as well as senior members of the
Lord Mayor’s office. Where useful we inter-
viewed middle managers. External experts
were included to avoid selection bias: we inter-
viewed an urban affairs editor of an influential
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newspaper who wrote about Sydney 2030;
senior members of the State Government
because of their rather adversarial position
towards the city, their views balancing per-
haps overly optimistic accounts of the city
administration; and experts and observers of
Sydney’s evolution (such as a well-regarded
former president of an architectural associa-
tion, a senior member of the Greater Sydney
Planning Commission, or the chief executive
of the Committee for Sydney, a body com-
prising 400 corporates devoted to the develop-
ment of Sydney). In total, we analysed 40
interviews (20 from 2007/2008 and 20 from
2016) with 32 different individuals. The inter-
views were semi-structured and covered ques-
tions on both the effects of strategy and the
conditions for its success. They lasted on aver-
age an hour, the shortest being just shy of 30
minutes, the longest lasting over 90 minutes.
All interviews were taped and transcribed ver-
batim. As a result of regular contact over sev-
eral years, many of our interviewees became
trusted conversation partners, read draughts
of our findings and kindly commented upon
them. This feedback loop proved invaluable
to ensure accuracy of our analysis and authen-
ticity of the resulting narrative.
To further contextualise our data, we also
studied a number of documents such as
white papers, strategies that developed spe-
cific ideas in various policy fields, and more
operational documents into which the strat-
egy had spilled over. Moreover, we analysed
reports, studies, newspaper reporting on the
city strategy and updates on the city’s web-
site. These data were important to gauge the
overall effect of Sydney 2030. Being our
main data source, insights from the three
rounds of interviews spanning a decade were
cross-checked and validated using this wide
range of supplementary material.
Data analysis
In order to translate our data into a narra-
tive, we followed methodology proposed by
Gioia and colleagues (2013). In a first step,
we paraphrased the statements from the tran-
scripts. We coded the salient articulations
that our interviewees provided regarding our
research question. During this phase, we
stayed as close as possible to their original
formulations, making ‘extraordinary efforts
to give voice to the informants’, as Gioia and
colleagues (2013: 17) suggested. Concepts
were developed inductively. In so doing, we
drew up a table of statements that sum-
marised different domains in which intervie-
wees described the multiple effects of
strategy. In a second step, we compared these
concepts and derived underlying themes.
During this step, we applied a more theoreti-
cal lens and condensed our initial concepts in
order to gain a more abstract understanding
of the effect of strategy. Finally, in a third
step, we further aggregated the themes into
abstract dimensions that provide the building
blocks for our theorisation and the model
that we will present in the discussion. We dis-
cussed the interpretations of data with each
other; in case of disagreement, we went back
to the original transcripts and discussed the
statements again in context. Figure 1 pro-
vides an overview of the analytical work
leading from interview data to conceptualisa-
tion and theorisation.
Findings: The effect of Sydney 2030
beyond implementation
Our analysis yields four dimensions (see
Figure 1) that we will describe below, build-
ing on the underlying themes and codes.
Prior to this, however, we wish to return to
2007/2008 and revisit the aspirations as to
how strategy was meant to shape the future.
Strategy by the (text)book: Imagining
Sydney 2030’s effects in 2008
When Sydney 2030 was originally crafted,
expectations were fairly conventional:
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Sydney 2030 was supposed to provide ‘the
blueprint for the future’ (E, 2008), as an
exercise that helps the city adapt to the envi-
ronment, find out where they want to go
and how to get there (W, 2008), whose posi-
tive effect would be in the implementation of
its proposed ideas. This textbook approach
to strategy was complemented by the con-
cern for implementation:
I don’t think a lot of people really appreciate
what strategy is. [.] to me strategy is the
whole package; it is sort of like the vision and
the goals but it is also you know the action
plans that sort of get you to that end goal,
because very often people sort of articulate
what they want, but they don’t put any sense,
anything behind it that actually says how we
are actually going to get there. (X, 2008)
Of course, they anticipated that ‘realities will
always impinge’ (V, 2008) and putting ideas
into action was by no means easy:
I think doing the vision is not easy but it’s not
necessarily the hardest part of the process. I
think the vision bit, once you’ve got that, then
the next level down to actually implement –
that is hard. It’s really hard. (H, 2008)
In sum, the strategists’ expectations in 2007
and 2008 of what their strategy would do
was to guide implementation of the plans
made, reflecting an understanding of strat-
egy and its effects much in line with what we
described above as the implementation
nexus.
Effect beyond implementation
Fast-forward to 2016: Sydney 2030 is widely
regarded as a success story. As a strategic
narrative, it has guided the city for a decade
and provided the springboard for the re-
election of the Lord Mayor:
Because it’s [2030] been successful, it’s been a
very powerful tool, you could say, for a re-
election of a Mayor. A very powerful tool. [.]
I think a lot of people would say, I’m going to
vote for Clover Moore, I’m actually voting for
2030. (C, 2016)
In this sense, Clover Moore’s victory at the
voting booths is also a popular vote on
Sydney 2030. However, critical voices from
the media5 and senior officials from the state
government (T, P, 2016) also describe
Sydney 2030 as highly effective. The success,
however, cannot be attributed to implemen-
tation; Sydney 2030 turned out not to be the
‘blueprint for the future’. It had proposed
ten flagship projects through which it would
deliver. Looking at what has actually been
achieved provides a rather sobering picture.
As one person very close to the strategy pro-
cess noted:
I suspect the majority of those actions [in
2030] weren’t implemented. [.]. But in some
ways, to me, that’s not so much the concern
or the issue [.]. (O, 2016)
A decade on, out of the ten projects only
one has been implemented – the light rail
along the eastern suburbs and the related re-
design of George Street – the central street
in the CBD – into a more pedestrian-friendly
street. Perhaps ironically, this project does
not reference Sydney 2030: the light rail proj-
ect owner is the NSW Ministry of Transport
who, in their project communication neither
acknowledge the city nor Sydney 2030.
Other multi-billion investments such as the
prestigious Baranagaroo project or the rede-
velopment of Darling Harbour are by no
means implementations of ideas developed
in the strategy.
Perhaps even more counterintuitive, our
data suggest that implementation might
sabotage the strategy’s intent. Our intervie-
wees stressed the ‘multidimensionality’ of
doing strategy (O, 2016). The light rail proj-
ect was no exception, the question being
whether it is ‘a transport project or is it a
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pedestrianising green city project? Is it a sus-
tainability project? Or is it a means of doing
a – a public domain? Or is it a land use facil-
itation project?’. Our interviewee suggested
that it is all of the above, and alluded to
paradoxical consequences that result from
actually implementing the strategic plan:
[.] so the danger in not having thought
through these multiple dimensions is that
when the people come to deliver the light rail,
all they care about is delivering the light rail.
(O, 2016)
Focus on delivery of the project, this inter-
viewee highlights, results in strategy drift
and goes against the spirit of the strategy as
a whole: the trams stop at Circular Quay
and, being 60 m long, the tram stop cuts the
city off from the waterfront even more –
although a key priority of Sydney 2030 was
to create better access to the harbour (O,
2016). Or: for capacity reasons the trains
have to be quite long – which will aggravate
the problem it was initiated to solve: ‘So we
go back to the problem that caused the light
rail which was end to end buses’ (N, 2016).
What this shows it that implementation
was clearly not the reason why Sydney 2030
is regarded a success story. Why is it that, in
our case, implementation – commonsensi-
cally the hallmark of an effective strategy –
is ‘immaterial’, as one of our interlocutors
put it? What else could account for its attrib-
uted positive effects?
Creating new shared sensibilities: Sydney
2030’s ecological rationality
First of all, as the most significant change,
Sydney 2030 created ‘new shared sensibil-
ities’ – mainly manifested in novel ways of
thinking about the nature of the city as well
as in providing an innovative language to
talk about it. For instance, one interviewee
explained that it ushered into being a ‘very
strong sensibility’ in relation to the urban –
‘a sensibility, but not necessarily a plan’ (B,
2016).
Rethinking the nature of the city
Sydney 2030 provided a different lens
through which to understand what ‘city’ and
‘urban space’ mean: the lens of experience,
not of property rights and ownership. Our
interviewees stressed that, as a former col-
ony, the latter had been the driving force for
decisions that shaped the city for a long
time. In contrast, Sydney 2030 ‘put the peo-
ple experience above the ownership experi-
ence. [.] it kind of looked through a
different lens’ (B, 2016). It brought a new
sensibility that shifted the conversation of
what made the city move towards thinking
relationally. The value of, for instance, a
building does not reside in bricks and mor-
tar, but in the relation between the building
and its environment. As one senior executive
stated:
It’s not enough to talk about your building,
you’ve got to think about your building in a
context. The value for your building comes
from its context and our job, as a city, is to
look after the context [.]. What I’m saying is
that the mentality of the citizens and the build-
ing owners and everything, it has been shifting,
to go, I get it. They’re not coming in so much
to talk about their building, they’re coming in
to talk about their precinct. (E, 2016).
Context represents a ‘collective good’ (P,
2016), and the city administration acts as the
‘custodian of context’ (E, 2016). The empha-
sis on context and the activities unfolding
between buildings can be referenced with
Jacobs (1961) who promoted the idea of the
urban commons as positive externality.
Following her thinking, Sydney 2030 intro-
duced a new sensibility that re-evaluated
what made the city work; it was, as one
senior strategist noted not uncritically, an
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exercise in the ‘marketing of the commons’
(A, 2016). Of course, critical urban scholar-
ship has highlighted the importance of con-
textual factors and the commons for a long
time (see Harvey, 2012); what was of interest
in Sydney 2030 was that strategy effectively
translated this ethos into the tool kit of city-
makers including politicians, developers and
citizen groups.
Sydney 2030 was seen as success because
it proposed to read the nature of the city dif-
ferently; it made the city legible in a novel
way. Instead of proposing a model, it embo-
died the search for relations and linkages,
looking for threads constituting the urban
fabric. This new integrative, contextual
thinking was highlighted and explicitly
referred to as the essence of ‘strategic think-
ing’ (H, 2016). Having a bigger picture
implied an understanding of what makes the
urban (or: what is the city-ness of a city)?
The search for reading city-ness differently
was articulated through the metaphor of the
‘jigsaw puzzle’. As one senior urban designer
(C, 2016) suggested ‘we have some pieces,
the state government others’. It was not cru-
cial who owned which piece of the puzzle,
but how to clip the pieces together and to
think holistically about their interactions.
To be strategic meant to keep one’s eyes on
the big picture, not the individual puzzle
piece. Losing sight of the big picture leads to
delivering a project – but to failing on the
overall vision.
Providing a new language for city-making. The
new sensibility also brought to life a ‘very
new language’ of ‘curating the city, co-
creating the city’ (E, 2016). Practical exam-
ples include concepts such as the ‘night-time
economy’ or ‘fine-grain development’ which
allowed capturing hitherto unexplored quali-
ties of the city:
It is at the level of perception I think, it’s actu-
ally once you have the language, once you
have the terminology, once you have not just
the vocabulary but the way the ethos is then
expressed and that becomes part of the
broader culture [.] [and the] repertoire and
the expectation and the way people think of
the city. (R, 2016)
As our interviewee recalled with a smile,
‘fine-grain’ had only been known as flower
mixture for ‘baking bread’ until Sydney 2030
made it part of the vocabulary of describing
urban experience, and thus part of the
toolkit of urban designers working on
improving urban experience.
Sydney 2030’s language invited diverse
stakeholders to debate the city in ways that
departed from the traditional language of
city planning an expert would use that was
precise but, at the same time, rather exclu-
sive and restrictive:
The problem with planning is that it’s a kind
of – it’s almost an arm of the legal profession
because planning, in order to be defensible,
has to use precise, overworked, jargonistic lan-
guage and make precise references so that oth-
ers can’t drive a truck through it. People learn
at that defensive mode of language to resist
erosion of the concept or the idea [.]. I think
the city did the best job in 2008 in breaking
that mold with this document [.]. It’s more
propositional and by that the virtue of the pro-
positional is it doesn’t have to be precise. (B,
2016).
Instigating collective discovery: Strategy as
transformative pedagogy
The second key dimension points to the fol-
lowing effect: Sydney 2030 represented an
ongoing process that was transformative and
led to an openness for evolving preferences,
new opportunities and alternative paths of
action.
Strategy as transformative journey. Our interlo-
cutors stressed the transformational quality
of strategy. For them, Sydney 2030 took
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those involved on ‘a journey’ which ‘was a
massively educational exercise’ (O, 2016). A
senior urban designer (N, 2016) reflected
that Sydney 2030 was ‘accelerating the
understanding’ of the ‘complex idea of mak-
ing the city’. Strategy’s effect does not lie in
proposing a solution to a complex problem;
rather, it lies in instigating a process of
developing a joint understanding of the city
as such. Doing strategy embodied a peda-
gogy that was educational for key constitu-
ents. This was particularly important with
regard to political decision-makers and
council members:
I think in some respects one of its [Sydney
2030’s] greatest influences was actually on the
elected members of the councils themselves.
[.] the document couldn’t be comprehensive
about everything, but on a large number of
fronts it had some basic policy thinking in
place so that when it became time for the
council to make a comment about something
at least they knew – at least they had some-
thing to start with instead of nothing. [.]
[Sydney 2030] had a very big role in educating
the councilors about how the city actually
works. (A, 2016).
Our interviewee expressed an important
point, arguing that the political decision-
makers came into power through mobilising
local constituencies around local issues, but
only a few of them would actually under-
stand the ‘complex idea of making the city’
(N, 2016). Hence Sydney 2030 was a learn-
ing journey for the councillors helping them
to understand the bigger picture.
Sydney 2030 was also educational for the
wider public who were invited to question
and re-imagine the city. One interviewee ela-
borated that the process ‘lifted the debate’
(L, 2016) and ‘got the population thinking
about urban matters’ (A, 2016).
Sydney 2030 as preparedness for opportunities.
Instead of providing a precise plan to be
implemented, Sydney 2030 triggered explo-
ration and search for opportunities:
It comes back to this whole notion of a strat-
egy as something that is aspirational, [.] that
a whole lot of things happen around and come
up to as opposed to necessarily it all working
out exactly how it might have been planned
[.]. It never really worked actually, but the
consequence of that though was just about
having – continuing to have that as in the ether
as a conversation based on the Sydney 2030
thing, when I think created that opportunity
around what’s happened now with Central
Park, with the Frasers [.]. The Gehry build-
ing [.]. You can never work out cause and
effect in those things. (I, 2016).
Other interviewees stressed that the merit of
strategy lies in being propositional and
explorative rather than precise (B, 2016),
offering a narrative of possible futures that
galvanises support in the present. A senior
strategist summarised this characteristic of
strategy as ‘direction without commitment’
(A, 2016): As a narrative form (i.e. genre),
strategy allowed to imagine a joint future
without asking immediately for commit-
ment. In this sense, strategy differs from
other genres such as planning or political
discourse in which ‘direction without com-
mitment’ is rather difficult to sustain.
Strategy was successful precisely because
it outgrew the original intent and led to new
opportunities that were hitherto unimagined.
Strategy’s effect was not only understanding
possibilities for change but also readying
people to act once an opportunity would
arise. This awareness was especially impor-
tant in the context of Sydney that has been
labelled the ‘accidental city’ (N, 2016, refer-
encing a book by Ashton (1993)). A senior
political advisor reflected on opportunity
structure and strategy:
It’s hard to nail down what was 2030 and what
was something else [.]. It was also I think a
matter of waiting for the right time. Because
Kornberger et al. 11
there was a plan in place, when the opportu-
nity presented itself, there was an intelligent
strategy to put forward. [Facilitator: It’s a bit
like luck favors the prepared mind?] Yeah, and
I think one of the strengths that all of that
work has done, I think probably if I looked
through there are a large number of things
that are still sitting there waiting for their time,
but it does mean when the opportunity pre-
sents itself we have a well thought through
approach that we can start to put on the table.
(D, 2016)
If luck favours the prepared mind, our data
suggest that opportunity favours the strate-
gic mind. As the interviewee argued, the role
of strategy is not to entrap the future and
force things to unfold according to a plan.
Strategy works more indirectly, as ‘warming
the room’:
What you have to do is be prepared [.]. So as
much of it as anything is just being ready for
when the time is right. Because the time can be
right really very quickly and you need to be
ready to go with it [.]. Then it’s what Rachel
Healy [Australian art director] used to call
‘warming the room’. It’s a great comment.
You know you warm the room so that the
room, when the idea comes up, it falls into a
ready mindset. (K, 2016).
Learning to dance together: Strategy’s
diplomacy
The third effect is captured best by one of
our interlocutor’s reflection that strategy is
about ‘learning to dance together’ (A, 2016).
With that phrase, s/he alluded to the social
efficacy of strategy, something we concep-
tualise as capacity to constitute a sense of a
collective urban identity.
Constituting community. Sydney 2030 was
described as engendering a sense of ‘we-ness’
amongst citizens, developers, owners, the
business community and other Sydneysiders.
Interviewees suggested that it had created a
‘constituency’ (O, 2016), built a ‘conscious-
ness’ (B, 2016) or, as another expert
described it quoting Anderson’s felicitous
phrase, Sydney 2030 created an ‘imagined
community’ (S, 2016). The effect of strategy
was to network people around shared issues
and concerns. One executive (H, 2016)
reflected that Sydney 2030 gave the city ‘a
ticket at the table’ of sustainability thought-
leaders; it granted access to a community-of-
practice. More locally focused, Sydney 2030
created its own community, a collective
around Sydney and its future. It provided
not only a distinct vocabulary to use but
ensured that not only ‘the loud voices in the
city’ (B, 2016) were heard. Hence, Sydney
2030 provided the canvas for the ‘imagined
community’ to form itself around the city as
place, engendering a sense of collective
urban identity and a feeling of ‘we’-ness.
Strategy was about building consensus
amongst its constituency. It ‘de-risked’, as
one interviewee (K, 2016) put it, certain
ideas, increasing their odds to happen
through forging the scarce resource that is
necessary for any major projects in the city:
public support.
Extending boundaries, bridging governance
gaps. Strategy did not only connect consti-
tuents within the city but also allowed the
city to extend its boundaries into areas out-
side its jurisdiction. Our interviewees high-
lighted governance gaps as a specific
challenge that strategy had to cope with.
Our findings reveal two kinds of governance
gaps (see Pierre, 1999) – horizontal gaps
(within civil society) and vertical gaps
(within government).
First, with regard to horizontal distri-
bution of decision-making, already at the
outset of the strategy project it was argued
that ‘the city is the result of billions of
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decisions about minor things’, hence any
form of central planning is at odds with
individual decision-making as ‘everyone is
an author in the making of the city’ (R,
2008). Given this distributed decision-
making, Sydney 2030’s challenge was to
identify ways and means to influence the
multiple ‘authors of the city’ so that their
decisions and actions were aligned (E,
2016). Strategy, to stay with the metaphor,
had to provide the leitmotif and rhythm
for the dancers to dance together.
Second, in the Australian context, frag-
mentation between hierarchical levels of gov-
ernment (municipal versus state and federal
levels of government) are the norm, resulting
in vertical governance gaps which formally
leave the City of Sydney little leeway for
manoeuvre. One of our interviewees with a
wealth of international experience in local
government noted:
I’ve never met such disempowered city govern-
ment as I’ve met in Australia because it doesn’t
exist [.]. So we are in the presence of a demo-
cratic deficit and a governance deficit that is
leading to random projects – essentially. I
think it’s catastrophic [.] What she [Clover
Moore] has done very well by the way is that
she’s used it [Sydney 2030] to manage upwards
[.]. (S, 2016).
We found a strong recognition that one of
strategy’s most significant effects was allow-
ing to cope with these problematic govern-
ance configurations. One interviewee
contemplated this by holding that ‘strategy
doesn’t know governance boundaries [.]. It
doesn’t know any boundaries, which makes
it really exciting. It’s like playing with fire’
(C, 2016). Such ‘playing with fire’ allowed
for collectively imagining ‘a future for things
that we didn’t control’ (K, 2016). This
capacity of strategy to spark inspiration in
areas that lie outside the city’s realm of
power and control was a prominent theme
in our interviews.
Discussion
Strategy’s effect as ‘institution nexus’
Johanson (2009: 873) diagnoses that much
of the public-sector strategy literature ‘has
been more oriented to introducing the tools
of strategy implementation than elaborating
on the nature of strategy itself’. Our case
responds to this criticism: based on our anal-
ysis, we observed that the implementation of
the only realised project proposed in Sydney
2030 undermined the actual strategic intent
of Sydney 2030 rather than bringing it to
life. In contrast, our study suggests three
alternative effects of strategy.
First, strategy ushered into being shared
new sensibilities, inviting city-makers to
rethink the city as commons and the urban
as a ‘mindset’: the city is not just bricks and
mortar – rather it is the context, the people
and relations between buildings that make
the city. Sydney 2030 provided a new lan-
guage to articulate and accelerate this shift.
We found that Sydney 2030 encompassed an
ecological (relational) rationality that was
focused on context, and the role of the city
as the custodian of such context.
Second, strategy was a transformative
process inviting constituents on a journey
that accelerated their understanding of the
complex nature of ‘how the city actually
works’. It instigated an openness for oppor-
tunities and encouraged a process of explo-
ration. Moreover, through ‘warming the
room’ it introduced a propensity to act when
opportunities presented themselves. Quite
contrary to predetermining the execution of
a plan, strategy produced the fertile ground
on which new ideas could fall; it sparked
curiosity, not closure.
Third, strategy entailed a form of diplo-
macy helping people to ‘learn to dance
together’ tactfully, to a shared rhythm and
leitmotif. Strategy constituted an ‘imagined
community’: this sense of ‘we-ness’ was
articulated through galvanising the public’s
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voice around shared concerns and a shared
sense of identity. It inspired commitment
through increasing the odds of desired things
to happen. In so doing, it overcame a num-
ber of governance gaps by engaging people
to collaboratively sketch possible futures
and think beyond the boundaries of power
and control.
How can we theorise these findings? The
new, shared sensibility, the transformative
process (pedagogy) and its diplomacy (learn-
ing to dance together) shaped what we call
with Fleck (1935) the city’s ‘thought style’,
and structured its community as ‘thought
collective’. For Fleck, a Polish bacteriologist
and co-founder of philosophy of science,
these were two inextricably related concepts
that share one point of departure: that
thinking is not an individual process, nor
can knowing be captured in the relation
between a knowing subject and a known
object. Thought style, Fleck (1935: 187) ela-
borates, is characterised by its ‘propensity
for directed perception and accordingly
directed processing’.6 Fleck’s own analyses
are especially enlightening for interpreting
our findings: He demonstrated how a novel
thought style and thought collective emerged
and became institutionalised, and subse-
quently led to new ways of perceiving and
acting (in his case, the meaning, categorisa-
tion and treatment of syphilis). A thought
style, once stabilised, trains perception of
the collective. As Fleck suggested, ‘the mat-
ters of the intellectual mood are the first
conditions of a discovery.’ (Fleck, 1935: 75).
With the notion of the ‘mood of thought’
(Denkstimmung) he described the socio-
cultural conditions for new ideas to emerge
and evolve.7 Once in place, Fleck spoke of
‘cognitive tracks’ (1935: 53) laid down by a
specific thought style along which cognition
develops. It produces a shared vocabulary
and understanding that opens the possibility
for collective action. Thought style and
thought collective capture the social
precondition and structural basis of mean-
ingful thought and action. Hence, thought
style is the epistemic condition for cognition,
meaning and truth. Thought collective is the
social condition for cognition to be intelligi-
ble, legitimate and resonate. In other words,
they provide the socio-cognitive infrastruc-
ture for collective reasoning to occur.
Thus, with Fleck, we contend that Sydney
2030 was effective because it brought into
existence a new thought style and structured
a thought collective around it. Following
Mary Douglas’ (1986) reading of thought
style and thought collective as ‘institution’,
we can elaborate our findings: the effect of
strategy as observed in Sydney 2030 is to
shape the city as institution. Building on
what she calls the Durkheim-Fleck pro-
gramme, Douglas (1986: 128) suggests that
‘each kind of community is a thought world,
expressed in its own thought style, penetrat-
ing the minds of its members, defining their
experience, and setting the poles of their
moral understanding’. Hence, for Douglas,
‘institutions think’ through providing
thought styles defined as set of shared
assumptions, categories, vocabularies and
frames (1986: 112). This theorisation allows
us to fully articulate our core contribution:
strategy is effective to the extent to which it
shapes the institutional a priori of what a
collective knows, what it can articulate and
how its members relate to each other. In
short, strategy’s long-term effect is to shape
how ‘institutions think’. Figure 2 sum-
marises our findings, highlighting the ‘insti-
tution nexus’ that complements the
‘implementation nexus’ already described in
previous studies (see Ferlie and Ongaro,
2015; Mulgan, 2009).
Extending the conversation in urban
strategy research
We contribute to the growing body of
research on strategy in public administration
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and urban studies through an empirical
inquiry into the long-term effect of strategy.
We argue that this effect should not only be
understood as coming from the ‘implemen-
tation’ of ideas into reality (as in the plan-
ning school) or mutual adaptation between
plans and reality (as emergent theories,
learning or muddling through would argue).
Nor is strategy as we analysed it a more
effective form of planning (Kaufman and
Jacobs, 1987). Rather, our study demon-
strates that strategy’s power lies in its capac-
ity to shape the institutional make-up of the
city.
This finding extends the current conversa-
tion in urban and public strategy research.
Work in the emergent, process and practice
tradition (see Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015) stres-
ses that over time plans inform actions and
actions, in turn, shape plans; strategy is con-
ceived of as both: intentions and plans that
shape future behaviour and post-hoc sense-
making of behaviour that has already
occurred (Mintzberg, 1987). Here adaptive
behaviours form patterns in streams of deci-
sions and actions that are read as strategy a
posteriori. In consequence, the effect of
strategy is difficult if not impossible to trace
as ‘unowned processes’, unintended conse-
quences, and a posteriori crafted narratives
collide in decision arenas (MacKay and
Chia, 2013).
In our analysis, we provide a different
proposition about the long-term effect of
strategy: through engendering a new, shared
sensibility, through transformational peda-
gogy, and through learning how ‘to dance
together’, Sydney 2030 shaped the thought
style and constituted a thought collective.
Conceptually, we captured this as institution
nexus. The distinction between implementa-
tion nexus and institution nexus is crucial.
Implementation focuses on the strategy–
action link, either (as in mainstream
research) prescribing the cause of events
from planning to action; or (more process or
practice inspired) through describing the
course of events as emergent interplay
between strategising and doing. The institu-
tion nexus is about changing the shared
socio-cognitive infrastructure of a collective,
its concepts, its logic of argumentation and
its vocabularies-of-motive. Implementation
remains focused on what can be delivered:
Figure 2. Effects of the Sustainable Sydney 2030 strategy and the institution nexus (summary figure).
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the ribbons that can be cut. The institution
nexus is about context and creating relation-
ships: the ribbons that tie together the col-
lective, its imagination and its ‘mood of
thought’.
Our findings have implications for the
debate about whether strategic management
tools lead to better performance in the pub-
lic sector. For instance, George and col-
leagues (2019) argue that performance is a
multidimensional concept, including effec-
tiveness, client responsiveness, financial per-
formance, outcomes and efficiency. In their
meta-analysis, the authors found that ‘effec-
tiveness might be the most important perfor-
mance driver to target through SP [strategic
planning]’ (2019: 7). Our article sheds a dif-
ferent light on the strategy–performance
link, revealing what kind of effectiveness
strategy may bring about: in our view, it is
not narrowly defined performance but the
formation of thought collective and thought
style – in short: the shaping of the city as
institution – that provides the necessary
socio-cognitive infrastructure for collective
action. Thus, our findings extend the discus-
sion on the strategy–performance link by
alluding to the important institutional foun-
dation for public administration – and how
strategy shapes it. In so doing our findings
resonate with recent research on urban stra-
tegies that stresses how strategy ‘inevitably
involves a new geometry of power relations
requiring the production and circulation of
knowledge, rationalities, subjectivities and
moralities’ (Certomà et al., 2020; Vanolo,
2014: 894), and work that highlights the cen-
tral role of curating imaginaries and shared
narratives of place (Potter, 2020) and the
performative effects of strategy (Brandtner
et al., 2017; Brorström, 2019; Kornberger
and Clegg, 2011; Van den Ende and Van
Marrewijk, 2018). By providing an empirical
example, we also speak to calls for more
research on how ‘frameworks’ and ‘urban
codes’ rather than detailed plans may master
urban complexity (Alexander et al., 2012;
Moroni, 2015).
Finally, our claim responds to Stewart’s
(2004: 21) call ‘to create a strategic ‘‘space’’’.
What we add to this idea is that strategy is
not only about providing this space but also
about structuring it, that is, the way a collec-
tive of actors relates to each other and thinks
with each other. This shifts the debate about
‘fit’ between organisation and its institu-
tional environment. We turn the concern
with how the institutional environment (via
legitimacy, resource flow, regulation) influ-
ences a public organisation (e.g. Andrews
et al., 2012) around and argue that it is the
organisation (the city administration) that
co-shapes its institutional environment via
strategy. This has implications for the ‘new
localism’ agenda in urban studies (Katz and
Nowak, 2017). This agenda suggests cities to
assume increasingly powerful roles in not
only local but also global affairs (Acuto,
2013). According to Katz and Nowak
(2017), the new localism is ‘multidisciplinary
in focus’ and ‘collaborative in practice’
(2017: 35) occurring in a ‘broader frame-
work of collective urban action’ (2017: 38)
and carried out by ‘networks of institutions
and ecosystems of actors that coproduce the
economy and cosolve problems.’ (2017: 223).
However, in contradistinction to Katz and
Nowak we put less emphasis on heroic lead-
ership to deliver this agenda; rather we con-
clude that strategy plays a crucial role in this
process: not because it delivers projects built
from bricks and mortar, but because it cre-
ates the shared socio-cognitive infrastructure
for people to reason and act collectively.
Concluding remarks
What practical conclusions does our article
invite? Strategy’s long-term effect beyond
implementation is its ability to shape how
we think of complex social entities (such as
the city), the vocabulary we can draw upon to
16 Urban Studies 00(0)
make them intelligible, and how we collec-
tively engage in designing them. We claim that
strategy’s effect lies in its capacity to shape a
thought style and form a thought collective.
Extending the insights gained from our study
to other areas, the role of strategy in the con-
text of non-command-and-control settings
includes a focus on contextual, relational
rationality, commons and positive external-
ities; the design of transformational processes
that disclose preferences rather than scramble
for means that pursue (if not dead then often
diffuse) ends; and the delicate task of inviting
actors to ‘learn to dance together’ – in short,
to provide a shared socio-cognitive infrastruc-
ture to ask questions and search for answers
and, with this, for collective action to occur.
Strategy, we may conclude, is like the North
Star in the night sky: one needs it for orienta-
tion and yet nothing could be further from
reality.
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1. Long- and short-term are of course relative
concepts that have different meanings in dif-
ferent contexts; in our case, we argue that a
decade is reasonable timeframe to reflect on
long-term effects (as opposed to 1- to 3-year
effects that might be labelled short-term).
2. See the city’s dedicated website: www.cityof-
sydney.nsw.gov.au/vision/sustainable-sydney-
2030
3. For detailed information about the strategy




4. A descriptive table of interviewees can be
obtained from the authors upon request.




gmdhas.html) in The Sydney Morning Herald
from February 2016: ‘Moore’s persistence in
pursuit of this 2030 plan is one of the sources
of her strength. She knows what is important
to her, her supporters say and pursues it dog-
gedly. This strength becomes apparent when
set against the limp results of the opportu-
nism practised by some of her detractors’.
6. The quotes were translated from the German
original by the authors.
7. We would like to thank one of our reviewers
for suggesting to include this concept.
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